Data from Solvo Institute in 2025 reveals a fundamental paradox that has long existed in democratic societies exposed to slowly growing security threats. In the Czech Republic, 70% of the population considers the risk of war real, yet 55% of these people say it "does not trouble them much yet", and only 15% declare serious concern. Conversely, 30% believe war poses no threat at all.
In international comparison (Germany, Sweden, Slovakia), the Czech Republic is paradoxically the least convinced of the possibility of armed conflict, even though Czech media and the public follow the situation in Ukraine far more intensively than the rest of the region. This difference points to deeper structural factors influencing how individual national societies interpret risk and work with it.
This gap between threat perception and non-response was described by Thomas C. Schelling, N. N. Taleb (2007) and A. F. Krepinevich. Societies tend to rationalise threats, accept their existence, but not react until a clear turning point or shock event occurs.
The aim of this article is to connect these theoretical concepts with new Solvo Institute data from 4 countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Germany, Sweden), analyse how manifestations of so-called "gradualism" are reflected in public attitudes toward military threats, and identify factors that influence the willingness of citizens to act in a real crisis.
Theoretical framework: when a threat grows slowly
Societal systems face significant difficulties in responding to gradually increasing threats. This phenomenon is characteristic especially of democratic countries in periods of relative stability. Three key mechanisms causing this paralysis:
1. Absence of urgency — individual threat signals are not perceived as critical until they accumulate or a turning point occurs.
2. Normalisation of threat — risk gradually becomes the "background" of everyday life and is interpreted as part of normal operation, not as a call to action.
3. Political caution — public representatives fear taking premature steps that might seem excessive or unpopular.
Schelling illustrates this pattern with historical examples: Britain in the 1930s monitored growing Nazi Germany's militarisation but reacted only when the threat became inevitable. Similarly, the United States had intelligence about Japanese intentions before 1941, but politically acceptable decision-making only came after Pearl Harbor.
*"Human inability to rise to the occasion may lead to Pearl Harbor, or to a remilitarization of the Rhineland."* — Arms and Influence (1966), ch. 6, p. 230
Nassim N. Taleb: The fragility of comfortable societies
Taleb in The Black Swan (2007) develops the concept of structural fragility of modern, economically stable societies. These societies are prone to fundamental failures during unexpected shocks because they systematically underestimate the probability and impact of extreme events, overestimate their ability to understand risk, and psychologically suppress information that disrupts their sense of certainty.
Czech society shows a high degree of subjective uncertainty (51%), yet also relatively high life satisfaction and optimism — 44% of respondents rate their life 8–10 (SK 39%, DE 41%, SE 40%).
*"Antifragility is not resilience. Resilient systems resist shocks. Antifragile systems get better from them."* — N. N. Taleb
Andrew F. Krepinevich: Insufficient capacities of democratic societies
Krepinevich in 7 Deadly Scenarios (2009) argues that modern democratic societies have a structural tendency to underestimate crisis preparation: maintaining defence capacities at a minimum, relying on a professional army and neglecting population preparedness.
Despite 70% of the population perceiving the possibility of war as real, 76% of inhabitants report never having undergone any form of military or defence training.
Empirical findings: gradualism in Czech data
Perception of the threat of war
- 15% — "I have serious concerns" - 55% — "I perceive the risk, but it does not trouble me" - 30% — "I don't think war is a threat"
In Slovakia, 23% of respondents perceive immediate risk, in Germany 27%, while in the Czech Republic and Sweden 15% and 14% respectively.
Absence of real defence preparation
Only 17% of the population has any form of military or defence experience, with just 4% having undergone military training outside former compulsory service. The vast majority — 76% — have undergone no defence preparation.
Willingness to undergo training: latent reserve
Men aged 16–44 show the highest willingness to undergo voluntary military training (39%), while women of the same age group show 25%. In the 18–60 age group (approximately 6 million people), potential willingness to engage in training could involve hundreds of thousands of citizens.
Support for mandatory measures: soft yes, hard no
71% support teaching civil defence in schools, 46% support three-month compulsory training after secondary school, only 36% support restoring annual compulsory military service.
Willingness to fight
Only 11% of the Czech population declares readiness to defend the country with arms — significantly fewer than Sweden and Slovakia (both 20%). Over 50% of the population would choose a waiting strategy.
Conclusion
The central question is not to convince the public that war may occur — this idea is already widely shared. The key is to create institutional, social and cultural conditions that enable threat perception to translate into real capacity to act before a strategic shock occurs. The answer to the gradual, "gradualist" character of current security threats cannot be further postponement of response, but precisely gradual, cumulative strengthening of national resilience.
Bibliography:
Schelling, Thomas C.: The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House, 2007.
Krepinevich, Andrew F.: 7 Deadly Scenarios. New York: Bantam/Presidio Press, 2009.